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Abstract 
An immense amount of research has been conducted within the field of intellectual capital 
during the past decade. Contributions have focused on uncovering aspects such as the 
management, leveraging and the reporting of intellectual capital. Much attention has been 
directed towards problems of accounting for intellectual capital and at the ways in which the 
value of intellectual capital at one level of an organization influences the value of intellectual 
capital at higher or lower levels of the organization. However, despite much focus, theory 
within this field is still in its infancy. In this paper, we propose an understanding of intellectual 
capital through the theoretical lens of emergent properties. We argue that the inherent 
difficulties of understanding the interdependencies of intellectual capital across different 
levels of organization can be traced to a lack of understanding of the differences between 
synergetic effects, causal relationships and emergent properties. This conceptual offering 
concludes that perceiving intellectual capital from the perspective of emergent properties 
contributes to eliminating a series of basic misunderstandings in connection with accounting 
for the value of intellectual capital and therefore offers a sound theoretical basis from which 
we may widen our knowledge of this field.  
 
Please do not quote without the permission of the authors 
 
1.  Introduction 
An immense amount of research has been conducted within the fields of intellectual capital 
and intangibles during the past decade. Looking back at this debate, it becomes evident that 
the interest in gaining a better understanding has emerged in a variety of different settings. 
Standard-setting bodies and several non-government organizations have e.g. been 
interested in gaining insight into how intangibles will affect accounting practices, while 
academic contributions have sought to verify valuation and accountability problems. In 
parallel, private organizations as well as government organizations in collaboration with 
researchers have experimented with their own models of intellectual capital reporting and 
management.  
However novel and interesting this field has been, and however many contributions that 
have emerged, a recent global symposium gathering the most prominent thinkers and 
researchers, confirmed that sound theoretical contributions within this realm are more or less 
non-existing. Despite the fact that previous contributions have focused on, and to some 
extent been successful in uncovering aspects such as the importance of managing 
intellectual capital, leveraging intellectual capital in relation to value creation and the 
reporting of intellectual capital to external stakeholders and shareholders, the extent and 
strength of theorizing is still criticisable.  
The development of theory in the field of intellectual capital must be based on 
interdisciplinary research. To understand organizational value creation it is vital to 
understand the significance of intangibles and intellectual capital as different types of 
knowledge and to understand that knowledge exists in different forms and therefore 
operates in different ways. In this manner, such notions also become crucial for 
understanding the value of the organization seen from the organizational perspective and 
the value of the organization seen from a market perspective. Hence, although intellectual 
capital theory by tradition is directed towards the fields of business economics and 
accounting, the field inevitably also draws upon elements of microeconomics, sociology and 
social psychology, as such fields become important in order to position intellectual capital 
from a research perspective. 
Much uncertainty in relation to the understanding of intellectual capital stems from the fact 
that unlike e.g. in the traditional accounting regime, it is not possible to add and subtract the 
value of intellectual capital and transfer value from one level of the entity to another, e.g. 
from departmental level to corporate level. From a literature review we find that there are at 
least three relevant levels concerning intellectual capital, namely the individual level, the 
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organizational level and the market level. In the remainder of this article we take our point of 
departure in these three levels.  
Individual knowledge is characterized by personal intellectual abilities. One peculiar property 
of these abilities is that they are present in the organization during the day, but disappear in 
the case where that individual leaves the organization; either to go home or to leave it 
entirely. In order to maintain that particular knowledge within the organization, such 
knowledge has to be passed on to someone else or another type of knowledge container, 
e.g. a piece of paper or a computer. The effect of individual knowledge can be measured at 
the individual level (e.g. IQ, specific competences or performance), but the impact from 
individual knowledge on value at the organizational level is not that easy to recognize.  
Intellectual capital at the organizational level must to some extent emerge from a process 
where individual level knowledge acts as components with structural mechanisms in the 
form of communication and the environment consisting of other structural properties of the 
organization. However, it is undisputable that intellectual capital at the organizational level 
has different properties than merely the sum of individual knowledge within the organization. 
In this manner, indicators measuring organizational level performance may show a picture of 
intellectual capital at organizational level but without indicating individual level knowledge. 
The individual knowledge does not disappear, but is embedded in the organizational 
structure. Thereby organizational interrelations and command structure define the way in 
which the organization operates and thereby constitute the mechanisms for the emergence 
of organizational properties. Finally, estimating the value of intellectual capital from a market 
perspective constitutes yet another and higher level of analysis.  
While existing theorizing in the field of intellectual capital is found to be inadequate with 
respect to offering a framework that incorporates and addresses the problems of different 
levels of analysis, we suggest that the perspective of emergent properties may solve such 
difficulties. The starting point for the emergent properties perspective is that phenomena at 
different levels of analysis have different characteristics, unique patterns of behaviour or 
have other specific properties. Thus, higher level properties are often not explainable by the 
properties of the lower level elements that cause the phenomenon. It is said that novel 
properties have emerged. The emergence of new properties from one level to another is a 
result of a process where subunits react in a process according to particular mechanisms 
under influence of the initial conditions determined by the environment for the process. 
We wish to stress the importance of shifting the basis for intellectual capital research from 
self-generating and self-reflective literature to solid knowledge of true scientific facts from the 
various relevant disciplines. We therefore believe that this approach holds the potential for 
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seminal research within the field of intellectual capital and intangibles. The remainder of this 
paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the foundations of emergentism and 
leads to the description of our model of analysis in section 3, namely the emergent 
properties perspective. Section 4 discusses and analyses existing research in the field of 
intellectual capital reporting and management from an emergent properties perspective. 
Finally, we conclude with respect to the contribution of our analysis to the understanding of 
the emergent properties of intellectual capital.  
 
2. The foundations of emergentism 
It is known from various fields of science; in particular from biology that nature develops into 
a number of different levels and that natural phenomena can be referred to these specific 
levels. For instance, in biology cells are subunits of organs and organ systems are subunits 
of the human organism. In the social world we find similar different levels. Boulding (1956) 
refers to such levels from a general systems theory perspective, eventually identifying nine 
different levels, which are applicable in the discussion of the general relationships of the 
empirical world. In an analogy of the biology example above we can refer that individuals are 
subunits of organizations. An organization’s characteristics are thus made up of a series of 
properties from a process beginning with the individuals’ (subunits) knowledge and skills, 
moving through group practices and traditions to organizational value creation through a 
number of mechanisms consisting of communication and organizational infrastructure. 
Many classic authors in the field of sociology have expressed ideas regarding the intricacies 
of different aspects relating to different levels of analysis. Among such contributions, we find 
Simmel, who operates with two different sociological levels of analysis, namely the 
psychological components of social life and the importance of social interrelationships (see 
Ritzer 1996 for a thorough review). Simmel (1907) adopted the principle of emergence, 
which was the idea that higher levels emerge out of the lower levels and according to 
Ritzer’s (1996, 158) analysis, this entails the creation of higher supra-individual formations 
as independent representatives for the interacting forces. Here the key message seems to 
be that a new entity which is qualitatively different emerges from the sum of the individual 
elements. We find a number of perspectives which relate to such notions, namely synergism, 
reductionism and holism. We will discuss later in the text how these perspectives differ from 
the perspective of emergent properties.  
The notion of emergentism in sociology was developed as a consequence of the common 
recognition of emergent properties in physics, chemistry and biology, and more recently 
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among researchers within psychology. Emergentism is therefore not a new idea. For 
instance, as early as in 1843, Mill wrote in his ‘System of Logic’: “All organized bodies are 
composed of parts, similar to those composing inorganic nature, and which have even 
themselves existed in an inorganic state; but the phenomena of life, which result from the 
juxtaposition of those parts in a certain manner, bear no analogy to any of the effects which 
would be produced by the action of the component substances considered as mere physical 
agents. To whatever degree we might imagine our knowledge of the properties of several 
ingredients of a living body to be extended and perfected, it is certain that no mere summing 
up of the separate actions of those elements will ever amount to the action of the living body 
itself” (Mill 1843, book 3, chapter 6, paragraph 1). 
Later, a number of  British emergentists developed theories in the line of emergentism in the 
field of philosophy of mind, among them Alexander, who in his ‘Space, Time and Deity’ 
(1920) states that “mental processes are not merely neural but something new, it involves a 
distinctive quality which emerges, rather merely being a resultant from the neural process”. 
Furthermore, he claims that “Emergent qualities are novel qualities that supervene on a 
distinctive kind of physico-chemical process” (Alexander 1920). This is one of the major 
points differentiating this theory from other classical sociological theories and theories in 
social psychology.  
It has been argued that there is a broadly perpetrated fiction in modern society, which is 
compatible with the development of the political philosophy of natural rights, with classical 
and neoclassical economic theory, and with many of the intellectual developments (and the 
social changes which generated them) that have occurred since the seventeenth century. 
This fiction is that society consists of a set of independent individuals, each of whom acts to 
achieve goals that are independently arrived at, and that the functioning of the social system 
consists of the combination of these actions of independent individuals. Such notions are 
e.g. expressed in the economic theory of perfect competition in a market, according to 
Coleman (1990, 300) most noticeably in Adam Smith’s imagery of the “invisible hand”.  
Opponents of such a systemic approach label themselves social individualists. Bunge (2000) 
argues that social individualists insist on studying only the components of social systems, 
that is, individuals, while ignoring their structure or set of connections. In other words, they 
do not wish to be mistaken for holists. In dealing with the behaviour of social systems, 
Coleman (1990, 2) initially claims that only in isolated cases do social phenomena directly 
derive from the behaviour of individuals and that it is the behaviour of the system or the 
behaviour of institutions as subgroups that has to be explained. In this manner he distances 
himself from the social individualist perspective.  
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In Coleman’s (1990) systems theory there are a number of central elements relating to the 
role of the individual in relation to the system that we wish to emphasize. Firstly, the 
interaction among individuals is seen to result in emergent phenomena at the system level, 
that is, phenomena that were neither intended nor predicted (Coleman 1990, 5). 
Furthermore, action only takes place at the level of individual actors and organization action 
is derived via some sort of interdependence of individuals’ actions, not merely from 
aggregated individual behaviour. Therefore, ‘system level action’ solely exists as an 
emergent property characterizing the system as a whole. Only in this sense can we talk of 
system behaviour. Nevertheless, system-level properties will result, so propositions may be 
generated at the level of the system (Coleman 1990, 28).  
In the words of Knorr-Cetina (1981) we can therefore question whether collectives in fact 
have distinctive properties? While the physical sciences seem to recognize the distinction 
between molar properties, i.e. properties of collectives considered as individuals, and 
molecular properties, i.e. properties of components considered as lower-order individuals 
(Knorr-Cetina 1981, 142), there is no presumption in the physical sciences that the parts of 
the collective should exhibit the same range of properties as the collective itself. 
Bunge (2000) describes an alternative to individualism and holism, which is in fact quite 
similar to emergentism. He claims “everything is either a system or a component of a 
system, and every system has peculiar (emergent) properties that its components lack” 
(Bunge 2000). He mentions that physical, biological and social systems normally are 
characterized by factors other than their components, environment, structure and 
mechanisms. According to Pepper (1926), such a theory of emergentism must involve three 
propositions: 1) that there are levels of existence defined in terms of degrees of integration; 
2) that there are marks that distinguish these levels from one another over and above the 
degree of integration; and 3) that it is impossible to deduce the marks of a higher level from 
those of a lower level and perhaps impossible to deduce marks of lower level from those of a 
higher level. Emergentism therefore acknowledges that in the move between different levels 
of analysis, new and qualitatively different properties will arise from original components as a 
function of mechanisms, structure and environment. 
In such a perspective, one is therefore forced to conceive of these phenomena as residing, 
not in the elements, but in the entity formed by the union of these elements. Durkheim (1982, 
39) exemplifies this by arguing that the living cell contains nothing save chemical particles, 
just as society is made up of nothing except individuals. Yet it is very clearly impossible for 
the characteristic phenomena of life to reside in atoms of hydrogen, oxygen, carbon and 
nitrogen. Durkheim (1982) goes further in the line of realizing that emergent properties 
explain the change in the qualitative when individuals form higher level properties, when he 
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discusses the difference between psychology and sociology: “Social facts differ not only in 
quality from psychical facts; they have a different substratum, they do not evolve in the same 
environment or depend on the same conditions. This does not mean that they are not in 
some sense psychical, since they all consist of ways of thinking and acting. But the states of 
the collective consciousness are of a different nature from the states of the individual 
consciousness; they are representations of another kind. The mentality of groups is not that 
of individuals: it has its own laws” (Durkheim 1982, 40). Opposition to such a theory of 
emergentism seems to arise primarily from researchers who do work within sciences where 
intensions play a significant role and where it is often assumed that phenomena exit outside 
the physical world.  
As mentioned previously, there are a number of perspectives which are sometimes 
mistakenly equivocated with emergent properties. Among these is synergism, which 
represents the idea that the whole is more than the sum of the effects from each individual 
part. Emergentism should not be understood as synergism even though the definition of 
synergism indicates that the resulting synergetic effect is larger that the sum of its parts. The 
efficiency gains from synergies appear at the same level and are of same nature. What is 
gained through synergy is of quantitative nature as subunits of synergy can be separated 
and function separately, but in emergentism subunits cannot produce the emergent 
properties separately and the outcome from the effect of emergentism is qualitative of 
nature. Emergentism is therefore different from synergism, because it represents something 
that is qualitatively different to the properties at a different level of analysis, e.g. that of lower-
level components.  
Emergentist theory is not holist theory although holist theory would include the emergent 
properties without clarifying the differences in qualitative nature at different levels. Holism 
does not incorporate an understanding of distinct levels of analysis, although a holistic 
approach attempts to operate with phenomena instigated by the actions of agents and social 
phenomena. In holist theory social phenomena can be viewed as the whole without the 
analysis of individual action, although the theory recognizes downward effects from social 
phenomena to individual action. Emergentism is therefore not equivalent to holism either, 
because emergentist theory explains phenomena as a result of the effects of subunits and 
mechanisms (for instance individuals and communication structures in an organisation) that 
emerge from one level to another and not just the effects of a non-defined “whole”. While 
holism merely states that the characteristics of a system and its behaviour cannot be 
predicted simply from looking at the system’s parts (Enigl 2003), an emergent property is a 
higher level property which cannot be deduced from or explained by properties of the lower- 
level entities. 
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Finally, a third alternative to emergentism is the reductionist point of view. Emergentism is a 
non-reductionist approach. The reductionist perspective solely attempts to explain 
phenomena at the organizational and the market level as caused by the effects of subunits 
alone and neglecting social action. Reductionist theory does not hold that phenomena at 
higher levels are the result of a process where components and mechanisms create new 
properties that do not exist at the lower level. Analysis and theory building based on subunits 
as the key elements in the reductionist causal upward explanation prove inconsistent with 
the reality in which these phenomena exist and insufficient in explaining why they exist. 
Nevertheless, in this reductionist point of view, the methodological individualism is the most 
predominant explanation type as an alternative to the popular holist view, where expressions 
as synergism along side methodological collectivism are being utilized indiscriminately and 
without formal definitions or specific purposes. 
 
3. The emergent properties perspective 
While the previous section illuminated the theoretical notions on which the emergent 
properties perspective rests, this section will introduce and describe in greater detail the 
framework which will be mobilized in the analysis of intellectual capital theory in section 4. 
Our point of departure is that phenomena at different levels of analysis have different 
characteristics, unique patterns of behaviour or have other specific properties. Thus, 
properties on a higher level are often not explainable by the properties of the elements at a 
lower level that cause the phenomenon. It is said that novel properties have emerged. The 
emergence of new properties from one level to another is a result of a process where 
subunits, which also could be named elements, entities or components, react in a process 
according to particular mechanisms under influence of the initial conditions determined by 
the environment for the process. Subunits are unable to produce the new emergent 
properties alone without the necessary mechanisms assisting the process and the 
environment in which the processes take place. 
In this connection, it is important to state that emergent properties are phenomena in the 
physical and social reality. Therefore, the emergent property perspective offered here can be 
used in a model of the reality to be analyzed, i.e. as the basis for an explanation type. From 
the notion of emergentism it is understood that phenomena arise from a hierarchy of levels 
in nature and that properties at a higher level have emerged from the effects from lower-level 
entities. The transition from a lower level to a higher level takes place through a process 
caused by the effects from the properties of the lower level components and involving the 
necessary mechanisms and laws plus the environmental conditions allowing for the process 
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to take place. The resultant higher level properties differ from the properties found at the 
lower level. The effects of the higher-level properties cannot be reduced to the effects of 
lower-level properties because the processes involve structural mechanisms and a number 
of environmental factors influencing the processes. Thus higher level entities and 
phenomena cannot be predicted directly from the knowledge of the properties at the lower 
level. 
It can be argued that the organization of individual knowledge results in an emergence of 
collective intellectual capital which is different from the sum of individual knowledge. The 
mechanism is organization of activities in which individual knowledge is utilized. Emergentist 
theory also includes downward causation, where higher level phenomena have downwardly 
causal effects on lower level processes assuming higher level properties constitute the 
environment for the lower level. 
For each level a suitable discipline has been developed in order to do research and build 
theory for description and analysis. Within the disciplines of Organization Theory, 
Organizational Behaviour, Human Resource Management, Knowledge Management and 
Social Psychology the subject is being dealt with from different angles such as the effects of 
collective knowledge by the collaboration of individual knowledge at the organizational level, 
organizational decision making or the organizational learning process. In this context 
collaboration is understood as the propensity to work in groups and in teams. It is thus the 
collaboration of skills that constitutes the mechanism in the process transforming individual 
knowledge to higher level emergent properties. The collaborative communication involving 
the exchange of work-related information and ideas is part of the mechanism transforming 
individual knowledge into an integral part of the organizational knowledge base. Individual 
knowledge in this manner transcends into intellectual capital as collective knowledge.  
To conclude on the verbal model offered above, the emergent properties perspective offers 
a different way of viewing the real world compared to the traditional views, which normally 
would either offer methodological individualism as the explanation of phenomena at a higher 
level caused by phenomena at a lower level, or offer methodological collectivism, which is 
used to explain lower level phenomena from a higher level perspective. In methodological 
individualism the direction of explanation goes from the individual level towards the collective 
level, and in methodological collectivism the direction of explanation goes from social 
phenomena towards the individual level, and individual action is viewed as something 
created from the collective.  
Applying the emergent properties perspective entails a bi-directional explanation.  It must go 
from the lower level towards the higher level, i.e. from the individual level to the collective 
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level, in our case from individual knowledge to organizational intellectual capital, and it must 
also go from the higher level towards the lower level, i.e. from the organizational level to the 
individual level as the organizational level constitutes the environment for the individual level. 
This explanation model offers obvious advantages for the analysis of the distinction between 
individual knowledge, organizational intellectual capital and the value of intellectual capital at 
market level. An example of this is the transparency explanation of the demands for 
improved intellectual capital reporting from a market point of view. The next section of this 
article constitutes a discussion and analysis of the most predominant streams of research 
within the field of intellectual capital from an emergent properties perspective. 
 
4. Discussion and analysis of intellectual capital in an emergent 
properties perspective 
In their seminal review of the field of intellectual capital research, Cañibano et al. (2000) 
identify three strands of literature in relation to accounting for intellectual capital (IC). The 
first strand concerns the recognition, measurement and depreciation of intangibles, while the 
second strand of literature concerns the relevance of some intangibles for the purposes of 
firm valuation. Finally, Cañibano et al. (2000) argue that there is a distinct strand of literature 
concerned with the issue of the classification and the economic nature of intellectual capital 
(see also Gröjer 2001). Petty & Guthrie (2000) and Andriessen (2004), likewise provide 
overviews of the literature and approaches to measuring intellectual capital. A notion of 
different analysis levels seems to emerge from the identification of the above three 
categories of literature. While strand one is concerned with correlating organizational 
characteristics to a market level notion of value, strand two seems to be concerned with 
illustrating how certain characteristics at individual and organizational levels of the 
organization interact to create value on the firm level. Finally IC management relates mainly 
to the individual level of the organization through a focus on knowledge management. <BUT 
HOW DOES ALL THIS INTERACT?> 
For the purpose of classification, it may make sense to distinguish between certain strands 
of literature in this manner. However, this does not imply that these strands of literature do 
not have any interconnections. As a matter of fact, it is the purpose of this article to 
contribute to the general understanding of the economic nature of intellectual capital by 
discussing insufficiencies of prior understandings and theory, thereby illustrating why and 
how specific strands of literature become problematic. Thus, with the aim of contributing to 
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understanding the relationships between intellectual capital and organizational performance 
we choose to focus our analysis on the reporting and management of intellectual capital.  
The past decade has brought a number of studies showing the declining ability of financial 
statements in giving a truthful indication of companies’ intrinsic financial value. These studies 
can be viewed as an offset for much of the literature concerning the importance of reporting 
and managing intellectual capital. According to Lev & Zarowin (1999), there is a weakening 
association between capital market values and key financial variables (see also Brown, Lo & 
Lys 1999, 107), and the traditional financial report therefore no longer represents the intrinsic 
value of the company. However this discussion has not been lopsided, and some research 
does in fact dispute that the value relevance of financial statements has declined over time 
(e.g. Francis & Schipper 1999; Core, Guay & Buskirk 2003). 
Some authors view the problems with the lack of explanatory value of financial statements 
as an effect of a significant rise in the degree of innovation in recent years (Chang 1998), or 
they claim that “today’s more volatile growth rate curves require a more complex approach to 
valuation” (Rutterford 2000, 13). Sullivan & Sullivan (2000, 328) attribute the inherent 
difficulties in the valuation of knowledge-based companies to the shift in the nature of value 
creation, because “[t]raditional accounting methods […] are inadequate for valuing 
companies whose assets are largely intangible”. Largely this can be related to the fact that 
the usual IC accounting treatment is to expense the items (Cañibano et al. 2000).  
Among the seminal discussants of the above problem are Hendriksen & van Breda (1992) 
who argue that the inclusion of intellectual capital in the balance sheet is problematic 
because such “assets” do not satisfy the recognition criteria of SFAC 5. Lev & Zarowin 
(1999), however, remain proponents of the view that such types of intangible assets, i.e. 
intellectual capital, should be accounted for using the same methods as for tangible assets. 
Basically, this discussion boils down to the correctness of the formula applied by Edvinsson 
& Malone (1997), namely: MV = BV + IC. In the 1990s intellectual capital was increasingly 
seen as an important supplement to or even corrective of tangible capital in the production of 
value.  
If not unrealistic, this formula is at least problematic because it implies that IC is dependent 
upon management’s and accountants’ depreciation and amortization choices. We contest 
this. Furthermore, Pike et al. (2001) criticize this formula, arguing that it is “flawed since the 
variables are not separable as required by the equation. Additionally, the obvious accounting 
flaw is that the right hand side of the equation does not have a single set of units” (ibid, 4). 
Thus, citing Justice (1707), they argue that virtual and real money cannot be added to each 
other. The expression of intellectual capital value is found to be ambiguous, as we must 
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differentiate between virtual value at the organizational level and real value. Here it is 
important to stress the difference between value at the organizational level and at the market 
level, as the nature of the two values is different from one another. Such a perspective is 
very much in accordance with an emergent properties perspective. It is not possible to 
combine market and organizational levels because these have different perceptions of value. 
In fact, IC may not have a market value in monetary terms at all. Therefore this equation, 
and the financial valuation of intangible assets as a whole, becomes problematic from an 
emergent properties perspective.  
Other authors are more concerned with the value relevance of intellectual capital, i.e. 
concerned with the question of whether intellectual capital is important for the valuation of 
companies and whether the market reacts to such information. Amir & Lev (1996) indicate 
that accounting information lacks relevance especially in high-tech industries. In a related 
study, Lev & Sougiannis (1996) find a positive association between firms’ R&D capital and 
subsequent stock returns. Such notions are problematic because they incorporate a 
misconceived understanding of causality and integrate different levels of analysis.  
It is a misunderstanding that we can put a monetary value on IC. The value given to IC in the 
market does not correspond to the value it has inside the organization, because the different 
categories of organizational intellectual capital are nothing more than components in the 
process creating value at share market level. The share market response is driven by the 
market mechanisms and the economic environment in which this market operates. Market 
mechanisms exist only because buyers and sellers do not operate as individuals but are 
organized in a structure operating as a whole in the market place. The value of intellectual 
capital at the market level is the value at a certain time and is a situational phenomenon in 
time and place.  
 
Reporting and management of intellectual capital  
Initially taking its point of departure in the ideas of capitalization and value relevance of 
intellectual capital, the literature concerning the reporting and management of intellectual 
capital constitutes a different arena of debate. Whereas the above debaters sought comfort 
in new ways or methods with which it would be possible to adjust existing accounting 
practices to convey a fuller picture of corporate value, the contributors to this stream of 
research do not try to put intellectual capital into accounting boxes. Rather, they take what 
can be termed a strategy perspective to the problem (Roslender, Nielsen & Bukh 2007). 
There are numerous so-called business reporting models concerned with providing external 
readers with a more complete picture of companies’ intellectual capital. Fincham and 
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Roslender (2003) classify these strategy oriented models for the reporting of intellectual 
capital into two types of approaches, and denote them as scorecard approaches and 
narrative approaches.  
Spurred by the then quite recent developments in performance measurement (cf. Eccles 
1991) such as the development of the Balanced Scorecard (cf. Kaplan & Norton 1992), the 
earliest approaches to measuring and reporting on intellectual capital adopted similar 
scorecard approaches to the problem. Therefore there are substantial similarities amongst 
these early IC reporting methodologies, which we will encounter in a short while in terms of 
classifying IC according to internal and external perspectives as well as forward-looking and 
historical perspectives.  
Concurrently with Sveiby and Stewart, Edvinsson & Malone (1997) developed their IC-tree, 
an approach also known as the Skandia Navigator because it was partially derived from 
Edvinsson’s work at Skandia, resulting in what many consider to be the world’s first IC 
statement in 1995. Initially, this model segregates intellectual capital into human capital and 
structural capital. Here human capital is viewed as everything the company cannot own. 
Structural capital, which can be further divided into customer and organizational capital, is 
defined as: ”…everything left at the office when the employees go home …Unlike human 
capital, structural capital can be owned and thereby traded” (Edvinsson & Malone 1997, 11).  
Such proposed disaggregations of intellectual capital are perceived more or less as a 
standard way of viewing intellectual capital (cf. Meritum 2002, Jacobson et al. 2005) 
although over the years we find small variations from author to author and model to model. 
One of the problems with these scorecard models is that several different levels of analysis 
are summed in an additive fashion. The methodologies applied link different levels of 
analysis in a causal and linear manner. However, this is not in line with reality as in practice 
there is no linearity and the interrelations are much more complicated. Furthermore, these 
scorecard models lack any conception of the mechanisms and processes whereby 
components at a lower level emerge to become higher level properties.  
Furthermore, there is clear evidence that these models misconceive value correspondence 
between the levels of analysis, i.e. from individual to organization to market level. This is 
particularly evident in an array of similar models trying to establish index ratings of IC. Roos 
et al.’s (1997) IC-index was among the pioneers in this respect (Rylander et al. 2000). The 
IC-index approach utilizes a set of indices with the aim of measuring and benchmarking the 
efficiency of strategy internally (1997, 91), ultimately relating the overall index to shareholder 
value. Roos et al. (1997) argue that their indices become leading indicators for financial 
performance by showing the direction and speed, i.e. the rate of change, of value creation as 
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opposed to the static measures of traditional financial reporting. Other approaches try to 
calculate an index indicating the efficiency of value creation (Kalafut & Low 2001) or 
earnings per knowledge capital (Lev 2001). Bukh, Larsen & Mouritsen summarize this 
predicament: ”Both Stewart, Sveiby and Edvinsson are interested in classification rather than 
measurement. …They state no formulas for choice of indicators. These are only present in 
examples, not in any integrated model” (Bukh, Larsen & Mouritsen 2000b, p. 19). 
In accordance with Roos et al. (2001), Jacobson et al. (2005) argue that it is the synergy in 
the intangibles that creates uniqueness and wealth, because “Companies become unique 
and successful by combining various types of intangible resources and not by separating 
human capital from structural capital and customer capital from organizational capital” 
(Jacobson et al. 2005, 575). This is a problematic stance, because synergetic effects solely 
relate to the same level. In combination with structure human capital, which refers to 
individual knowledge, will create intellectual capital as an emergent property. In the 
terminology of Jacobson et al. (2005), structural capital has the same level as human capital, 
which inevitably confuses the whole issue relating to different levels of analysis.  
It can thus be considered problematic that Roos et al. (1997) and other index approaches 
have one overall goal, namely to try to aggregate the individual indices and relate this overall 
measure to market value, in this sense holding on to a shareholder value perspective. 
Thereby they attempt to hold on to all three levels of analysis, in effect not being able to 
contribute anything sensible to any of them. Considering the scorecard approaches 
generally they seem to be concerned with identifying separate sets of performance 
measures with either relational, causal or no interconnectivities at all. A crude interpretation 
could therefore be that merely one set of alternative performance measures would be 
sufficient for enticing a better understanding of value creation. We consider this to be a 
serious flaw in these approaches because the reader is left without explanation of how these 
– highly unfamiliar – types of measures relate to each other and to the overall performance 
of the firm.  
The second type of IC reporting models is what Fincham & Roslender (2003) call the 
narrative models. Compared to the scorecard approaches they rely more upon ‘soft’ 
narratives, although by no means excluding key performance indicator-type information 
(Roslender 2005). The perspective underlying these types of models is precisely that merely 
providing the potential reader with an alternative set of performance measures will not get 
the point through. As a matter of fact, such new types of information impose markedly higher 
understanding costs to users, because they do not have the necessary rules of thumb to 
incorporate them in their analyses (Nielsen et al. 2006). 
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The Meritum guideline (2002) was the physical result of a Pan-European research project 
with attendance of academics from Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and many other 
countries. The purpose of this reporting model is to assist companies in the recognition and 
disclosure of the intangibles that are critical to their value creation. The underlying idea is the 
linking of corporate vision and strategy with critical intangibles and success factors through a 
narrative envisaging how the different stakeholders benefit from the firm’s knowledge 
production activities (Meritum 2002, 68). Here strategy acts as an encompassing guide to 
the choice of performance measures complemented by a context-giving narrative.  
Probably the most notable of the narrative models is the Danish guideline for IC statements 
(Mouritsen et al 2003). The model comprises the most empirically applied business reporting 
model worldwide until now. According to Mouritsen et al. (2001a), intellectual capital 
statements are reports that through text, indicators and illustrations present the firm’s 
knowledge management effort.  Following the Danish Ministry of Science and Technology 
(Mouritsen et al., 2003a), the purpose of an intellectual capital statement is to communicate 
the use value, knowledge resources and management challenges of the company. In a 
narrative form the use value outlines the ambition of the company’s knowledge 
management, because it not only accounts for present performance, but also formulates a 
strategy for the company’s know-how in the future. The company’s management challenges 
are a set of meaningful and lasting elements in the managerial agenda that provide 
continuity in handling the development and composition of knowledge resources.  
To develop and compose knowledge resources, efforts or activities are made to increase or 
descrease ‘knowledge containers’ such as employees, customers, processes or 
technologies and the effects of those efforts are monitored via indicators e.g. about staff 
turnover and job satisfaction, in-service training, turnover split on customers, customer 
satisfaction, precision of supply etc. (cf. Nielsen et al. 2006).  
Mouritsen et al.’s (2003) IC model can be described as a relational model of measuring and 
reporting on IC and neither indicators nor activities are considered to be causally linked 
between each other. Rather, according to Mouritsen, Bukh & Bang, “initiatives and thus 
indicators may be seen as bundles that support and measure management challenges in an 
ecological way rather than as individual initiatives and indicators that contribute to support 
and tell something about the management challenges” (2003, 19). This model becomes 
problematic because the four archetype categories of knowledge resources identified (i.e. 
employees, customers, processes and technologies) comprise a mixture of two levels of 
analysis, namely the individual and the organizational level. Through the narrative the model 
does, however, attempt to explain the mechanisms by which bundles of intellectual capital 
indicators relate to value creation.  
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In the above discussions of the IC field there is an evident notion that individual level 
performance and organizational performance and value are interlinked, which we see as an 
over-interpretation. Although organizational performance is somehow related to or caused by 
the individual level of performance, organizational performance is a result of organizational 
intellectual capital which is created through a process as an emergent property. 
Furthermore, IC imposes problems not only in relation to valuation. Management control too 
is challenged, as intangible resources constitute the key to value creation. Discussions in 
relation to this perspective can be found in Johanson et al. (2001) who are an integral part of 
the Swedish human resource management school. More recently, a special edition of 
Management Accounting Research has focused on the issue that “the existing framework of 
management control may, in fact, be irrelevant, that the control needs of the current 
environment are significantly different from those developed in an earlier period and that 
improvements are urgently required” (Nixon & Burns 2005, 260). Such a perspective is 
elaborated on in relation to IC and knowledge management by Mouritsen & Larsen’s (2005) 
contribution to this special edition. 
In the words of Thorbjørnsen & Mouritsen (2003), the role of the individual in intellectual 
capital statements is often highlighted as perhaps the key to knowledge management. This 
is because they are said both to be the true bearers of knowledge and at the same time a 
potentially fragile resource, because they cannot be owned (see also Edvinsson & Malone 
1997, 11). According to Baxter & Chua (1999), we can separate knowledge management 
into two different waves, namely the process paradigm and the measurement paradigm. 
They argue that while the process paradigm is concerned with the sharing and diffusion of 
knowledge, the measurement paradigm is more concerned with visualizing knowledge. 
Mouritsen & Larsen (2005) label these waves the 1st and 2nd waves of knowledge 
management.  
Baxter & Chua (1999) and Mouritsen & Larsen (2005) argue that in the 1st wave, knowledge 
management takes its point of departure in the individual. Thereby its primary concern 
becomes the sharing of knowledge between individuals in the organization. Thus the 
management of the individual-based knowledge, e.g. in the form of systems and intranets, 
will always take place at an organizational level. Such management is primarily concerned 
with making tacit knowledge explicit, e.g. through codification and thereafter transforming 
individual knowledge to organizational knowledge. In relation to these mechanisms, 
Nonaka’s (1994) knowledge spiral is the most notable contribution, identifying the four 
knowledge sharing processes: socialization, externalization, internalization and combination. 
This approach would be improved if the distinction of levels was emphasized, as by 
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definition sharing of knowledge takes place at the organizational level through the 
organizational structure and thereby becomes intellectual capital as an emergent property.  
In this context, knowledge management is about creating an appropriate organizational 
infrastructure with the aim of facilitating the circulation of individual knowledge to potential 
users (Baxter & Chua 1999, 8) with the intent of reassembling, repositing or reusing 
(McNamara, Baxter & Chua 2004), e.g. knowledge transfer. Most contributions related to this 
wave are concerned with a technology perspective on knowledge management (cf. Hansen 
et al. 1999), in what Christensen & Bukh (2005) pronounce an artifact-oriented 
epistemology.  
In the second wave (Mouritsen & Larsen 2005), knowledge management concerns the 
composition, use and development of the organizations’ knowledge resources. In the second 
wave context the discussion is poised from an IC and a reporting perspective and the 
discussion is concerned with the organization as a whole rather than the individual, which 
was not the case in the first wave. Here, knowledge management can be characterized as a 
set of knowledge management challenges and activities paired with measurements relating 
to the actual state and realization of these.  
As described in the above paragraphs, the Danish IC framework is quite clear about the 
interrelations between measurement and reporting on the one side and the management of 
IC on the other side. According to Mouritsen et al. (2003), the IC statement is a report on the 
company’s knowledge management strategy, effort and success. From their perspective, 
knowledge management relates to what the company actually does, i.e. the activities 
performed in relation to upgrading, acquiring and attaining knowledge that makes a 
difference to the company’s value creation.   
 
Concluding remarks 
The conceptual offering described in this article entails that perceiving intellectual capital 
from the perspective of emergent properties can contribute to eliminating a series of basic 
misunderstandings in connection with the accounting for IC value and therefore offers a 
sound theoretical basis from which we may widen our knowledge of this field. 
Initially, we presented a framework for analyzing and understanding the interrelationships of 
value at different levels of organization. In section 4, we analyzed on the literature 
concerning the reporting and management of intellectual capital from an emergent properties 
perspective. From this perspective it was evident that the direction of explanation could be 
both upwards and downwards, i.e. from the individual level to the organizational level in 
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relation to the formation of organizational intellectual capital, and from the organizational 
level downwards to the individual level in order to explain the environment for learning 
processes and the expression of individual knowledge in the act of collaboration. 
From an emergent properties perspective, intellectual capital at the organizational level is 
viewed as a structural arrangement of lower level components and thus becomes the 
organization of knowledge resulting in an emergence of collective intellectual capital greater 
than or different from the sum of individual knowledge. Here it therefore constitutes a 
production factor, i.e. a competitive advantage, while at the market level it must have an 
exchangeable financial value. These two notions of value are not interrelated in a linear 
fashion and therefore we must dismiss much research in the field that does not contemplate 
this problem.  
Emergent properties offer a perspective that can help to explain micro-macro link from the 
individual level to group and market levels, e.g. from lower levels in the organization to the 
market level where the organization is considered an independent entity interacting with 
other organizations. Furthermore, we conclude that it is not relevant to analyse macro 
phenomena at micro level or to describe micro phenomena in macro level terminology. Even 
though intellectual capital at the organizational level is a function of individual knowledge as 
a primary component, such knowledge would have no effect on value creation without the 
organizational structure. 
The emergent properties perspective therefore offers a unique critique in relation to a series 
of flaws in existing IC concepts and strands in the debate, perhaps helping to explain why 
some parts of the academic community have had difficulties in accepting such contributions. 
There seems to have been a number of holes in existing theory that primarily pertain to 
problems of moving value from one level to another. Our theorization shows that such ideas 
do not make sense in the world of IC, as the value of knowledge at the individual level 
cannot possibly correspond to the value of intellectual capital at the organizational level, e.g. 
in relation to value creation potential. Furthermore, these ideas become even more 
problematic when trying to relate value at an organizational level to market values.   
It is our hope that this contribution may offer food for thought, not only in relation to 
understanding the concept of value in relation to different levels of intellectual capital, but 
also in relation to emphasizing the importance of interdisciplinary research. In our case we 
illustrate how a theoretical proposition stemming from the fields of biology and sociology can 
be applied in the field of accounting. We have argued that the inherent difficulties in 
understanding the interdependencies of intellectual capital across different levels of 
organization can be traced to a lack of understanding of the differences between synergetic 
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effects, causal relationships and emergent properties. This conceptual offering concludes 
that perceiving intellectual capital from the perspective of emergent properties contributes to 
eliminating a series of basic misunderstandings in connection with accounting for the value 
of intellectual capital and therefore offers a sound theoretical basis from which we may 
widen our knowledge of this field. 
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